

steadying the economy (Corrado, Haskel & Jona-Lasinio, 2015). For sustainable development of any nation, public sectors are significantly liable, the public sectors are owned by the public, though public sectors are significant for nation building, they are not run and controlled by the owner and the public sectors are run by the civil servants and controlled by the government on behalf of the public (Ahmed & Javed, 2017). The usage of some public goods and services is open for all. In those cases of public goods and services that are opened for all, a customer may be capable to gain the facilities of a good or service without paying (Pasour, 1981). In that situation, if the customer is reluctant to pay for the consumption of the goods and services, it is not technically possible to exclude them from the usage of public goods and services (Merickova & Muthová, 2019). Who can reduce that problem? The community leaders, who support the government system, can resolve the problem of using goods and services of public sectors without paying (Ozono, et al., 2016). Who are the community leaders in the public sectors? Muir (1930) has stated that when political governments rise and fall, ministers come and go, the civil servants of a nation drive on ever. Civil servants are significant for nations building. Civil servants support into construct policy, execute policy, deliver government facility, accomplish development works and establish public security and safety. Public Service Commission of South Africa (2007) has stated that civil servants provide support to the government in growth and development. Ministry of Civil Service and Labor of Rwanda (2002) has identified that the civil servants are the substantial component behind economic development and progress of community. UPSC (Union Public Service Commission of India, 2015) indicated that the volume of complex and diverse issues in the public sectors have enhanced the significance of the civil servant in modern civilization. Which attribute of civil servants can reduce the gap of running and managing public sectors by them, not by owners or community? According to Javed (2017), it is the ownership attribute of civil servants that can minimize the gap of running and managing of public sectors by civil servants. Satish (2004) has said that civil servants have influences to increase the value of public goods and services through ownership attribute to facilitate the citizens that are vital for sustainable economic development and growth. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2012), the notion of civil servants is the holding professionalism, integrity and ownership attribute that are the significant for solving any shortage of running and management in the public sectors by civil servants. So, the public sectors aren't run and managed by owners, those activities are done by civil servants on behalf of the community and the ownership attribute of civil servants can minimize that the absence of owners in those matters.

2. The concept of ownership attribute of civil servants

The ownership attribute of civil servants in activities is a spiritual element that generates an alignment between the community's work and responsibility of civil servants in the public sectors (Uslu, 2015). It is the mental commitment and inherent inspiration of civil servants to the public sectors (Uslu, 2014). It is the situations, where the civil servants understand the community wants, they work for their responsibility for community and they give effort for running and managing of public sectors by trust

(Eisenberger et al., 1990). It is the psychological promise by civil servants to the owners of public sectors and an intermediary contribution by civil servants to run and manage the public sectors instead of community (Mayhem et al., 2007).

3. Significance of ownership attributes of civil servants in the public sectors

The public sectors are owned by the society and they don't come to manage the public sectors, so the ownership attribute of civil servants are needed for social responsibility, since the civil servants run the public sectors (Perry & Rainey, 1988). As the owners are a far from control and management of the public sectors, the civil servants' management is required in the public sectors, so civil servants have a duty to hold ownership attribute for running and managing the public sectors (Caron & Giauque, 2006). The civil servants must be independence in the public sectors for higher performance and on the contrary, they must have accountability to the community, if the community can realize that civil servants have ownership attributes for community's work, they will provides more independent to civil servants for work (De Visscher & Varone, 2004). As the owners are absent in case of regulation in the public sectors, civil servants do the society's work and ownership trait of civil servants is recognized as an essential condition for public sectors' effectiveness to bring the optimum balance between regulation of community and self-regulation of civil servants (Arrow, 1974). When political government rise and fall, ministers come and go, the civil servants of a nation drive on eternally, hence civil servants are duty-bound to have ownership attribute to do the society's work (Muir, 1930).

4. Ownership attributes of civil servants and its inputs

The social recognition and job security generate motivation and commitment among civil servant for public sectors, that motivation and commitment create ownership attribute among civil servants (Becker & Huselid, 2006). The inspiration and commitment come to the civil servants by job satisfaction and government should take initiatives to confirm job satisfaction of civil servant and that inspiration and commitment bring ownership attribute among civil servants (Hosmer, 2007). The ownership attribute of civil servants for public sectors is generated from motivation and promise aspect of civil servants, those inspiration and promise of civil servants come from potential social acknowledgment and to what extend the government provides the self-determining authority for taking decision in activities to the civil servants (Payne & Wayland, 1999). The work for the progress of nation is a courageous effort and such emotion in the civil servants of the public sectors generates motivation and commitment among them and that motivation and commitment create ownership attribute among civil servants (Beauchamp et al., 2011). Promising responsibilities of civil servants inspire and make committed in the public sectors, that inspiration and commitment produce stewardship among civil servants (Hosmer, 2007). The commitment and motivational standards enhance ownership among civil servants (Fagbemi, 2006). The issue of motivation and promise among civil servants attempted to bring stewardship among civil

servants (Phillips, 1999). The civil servants do community's work in the public sectors; because the owners are remote from the running of public sectors and that community's responsibility generates commitment and motivation and consequently ownership attribute among civil servants (Parker, 2000). The inspiration and promise of civil servants in the public sectors denotes to the degree of their feeling of rights and that inspiration and promise have positive relationship with ownership attribute of civil servants (Parker, Wall & Jackson, 1997). The motivation and inspiration of civil servants in the public sectors come from the satisfaction of needs by salary of the government and those motivation and commitment of the civil servants produce ownership attribute among them (Minns, 1996). Therefore, it is clear ownership attribute of civil servants in the public sectors comes from motivation and commitment attributes of them.

We can hypothesize that;

Hypothesis-H1: Motivations and commitment attribute of civil servants have positive relationship with ownership attribute of civil servants in the public sectors.

4.1. The concept of motivation and commitment attribute

Motivation of civil servants is the procedure that keeps, directs and initiates goal focused actions in the public sector (Vandenabeele et al., 2004). It is the inspiration of civil servants in the public sectors to achieve the community's goals (Giauque et al., 2013). It comprises the emotional and communal influence of civil servants (Brewer & Selden, 1998). It is the biological and mental commitment of civil servants (Wright, 2001). It is a motive for readiness, movements and objectives (Perry, 1996). It is the fulfillment of satisfaction of civil servants in the organizations, (Perry, 1990).

Commitment of civil servants in the public organizations is a bonding responsibility of civil servants for the community (Abdul-Nasiru, et al., 2014). It is the engagement and obligation of civil servants for public sectors (Adu, 1968). It is the circumstance of worth of being committed to the community's activities by civil servants in the public sectors (Angle & Perry, 1981). It is the devotion and loyalty for community by civil servants in the public sectors (Heady, 1984). It is the obligation and responsibility to the community by civil servants in the public sectors (Kumasey, Bawole & Hossain, 2016). It is the duty and burden to the society by civil servants of public sectors (Abdul-Nasiru et al., 2014)

4.2. The ownership attributes of civil servants in the public sectors and its output

If the civil servants own the public sectors, an alignment is established between the community's work and duty of civil servants and that procedure improves the proficiency of civil servants and performance of the public sectors (Javed, 2017). The ownership attribute of civil servants to the public sectors is the psychological agreement between the community and civil servant and that psychological agreement

enhances the performance of public sectors (Kruse, 2016). It creates liability among civil servants for the public sectors and that liability of civil servants has positive interaction with performance of public sectors (Michie, Oughton & Bennion, 2002). Ownership attribute of civil servants in the public sectors is the spiritual inspiration and commitment, which has positive relationship with the efficiency of civil servants as well as the performance of public sectors (Beauchamp, 2011). It creates wide answerability and morals of civil servants, they are nominated agents and used community's wealth and that process enhances the competence of civil servants and performance of public sectors (Caramelli, 2011). If the community recognizes the activities of civil servants that wide the ownership attribute among civil servants for the public sectors, this procedure increases operative contribution and efficiency of the civil servants and the performance of public sectors (Wong, 2012).

We can hypothesize that;

Hypothesis-H2: Ownership attribute of civil servants has positive relationship with performance of the public sectors. .

4.3. The concept of performance

Performance is the accomplished effort by the workers that are allotted to them in the organizations (Borman, Motowidlo & Schmit, 1997). It is the work connected actions likely to perform by an employee and it indicates the act, which is accomplished a by person (Campbell, 1990). In an organizational condition, performance is a recommended assigned objective between a supervisor and a subsidiary that are accomplished as the responsibility of employees in the organizations (Conway, 1999). Performance is the employees' achievement, for which they are indebted in the organizations (Donohoe, 2019). It is the employees' work connected with the organization's goals and objectives (Swarthout, 2018).

Sometimes ownership attribute is not generated among civil servants in the public sectors properly. It is lack of ownership.

4.4. The concept of lack of ownership attributes of civil servants in the public sectors

Lack of ownership attribute of civil servants in the public sectors is the non-existence of relationship between civil servants and public sectors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It is the absence of affiliation between public sectors and civil servants (Heracleous, 2010). If agency relationship does not work appropriately, the lack of ownership attribute between civil servants and public sectors is raised (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Lack of ownership attribute between civil servants and the public sectors is the deficiency of relationship (Chen & James, 2020). It is the absence of association between civil servants and public sectors (Eisenhardt, 1989).

4.5. Lack of ownership attribute of civil servants in the public sectors and its consequences

Lack of ownership attribute is the deficiency of link between civil servants and public sectors and that deficiency of link produces agency problem between civil servants and public (Gaul & Stebunovs, 2009). The lack of ownership of civil servants of public sectors creates inefficiency in running and managing of community's work by civil servants, that inefficiency is liable for the agency problem (Oliveira & Filho, 2017). If the civil servants of public sectors do not own the business of community, the agency problem will come (Ross, 2019). Lack of ownership attribute of civil servants in the public sectors creates frustration among the community and such frustration of community generates the agency problem in the public sectors (Boshkoska, 2014). It is a way to prevent progress of nations and if the progress of nations is prevented, the community is deprived that generates the agency problem between civil servants and public sectors (Eun & Resnick, 2004). It generates the non-existence of the relationship between the civil servants and public sectors, that non-existence of relationship generates agency problem between them (Roach, 2016). It creates absence of possession of community's work that generates agency problem of between civil servants and public sectors (Moe, 1984). If the civil servants in the public sectors go home early and leave the task incomplete, the lack of ownership attributes is generated among them and in that situation the agency problem is created in the public sectors (Tipuri & Podrug, 2010). If the impact of the civil servants' work in the public sectors doesn't recognize by the community, the deprived feeling comes to the mind of civil servants and the lack of ownership attribute is generated among the civil servants and from that the agency problem comes into public sectors (Lasher, 2008).

We can hypothesize that;

Hypothesis-H3: Lack of ownership attribute of civil servants has positive relationship with agency problems between civil servants and public sectors.

4.6. The concept of agency problem

The agency problem is the non-existence of relationship between two parties (Roach, 2016). It is the problem between principal and agent in the organization (Moe, 1984). The agency problem is a conflict of importance in any association where one party is estimated to do work in another's top willingness (Gaul & Stebunovs, 2009). It is the breaking of mental and institutional agreements between two parties (Oliveira & Filho, 2017).

5. Methodology

The author has gathered the primary data from the civil servants of Bangladesh. The sample size is 200. The author has selected sample by random access method. Different categories of civil servants are selected randomly. The author collected most of the data by face to face meeting with respondents and some are collected through internet. Prescribed questionnaires were set to collect primary data. The

author examined data from views of hypotheses built. The author similarly used secondary data. The secondary data are used in literature study of the paper. The paper acknowledged descriptive analysis approach which used together expressive (means & standard deviations) and inferential measurements (correlation & regression study) for effective creation. The arithmetical programme, the paper uses the SPSS version seventeen (25) to examine the data. Except else noted, all items were on a 5-point Likert answer scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

6. Results

The author will analyze the important of data. To test the important of the data, the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variance are calculated.

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Coefficient of Variances

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	CV= SD/Mean
Motivation and commitment attribute	4.5425	0.40961	0.090172
Ownership attribute (dependent)	4.2718	0.39682	0.092892
Ownership attribute (Independent)	4.4447	0.46425	0.104450
Performance	3.9688	0.45593	0.114878
Lack of Ownership attribute	4.5325	0.36432	0.80379
Agency problem	4.1663	0.36777	0.088272
Source: Prepared by author.			

From the above Table, the maximum of the mean values are more than 3.9. It indicates, items relating to motivation and commitment attribute of civil servants, ownership attribute of civil servants (dependent), ownership attribute of civil servants (independent), performance of the public sectors, lack of ownership attribute of civil servants and agency problem are supported by respondents. In the most cases, the standard deviations are less than one. It indicates that the dispersion of a dataset relatively low. A $CV \geq 1$ indicates a relatively high variation, while a $CV < 1$ can be considered low. In all cases, it is shown that CV values are less than 1, so variances or deviations are less. Statistically those data are significant.

The correlations and R^2 between variables and P values of all variable are given in the Table;

Table 2: The correlations and R^2 between variables and P values of all variable

Correlations and R^2 between independent and dependent variables	Correlations (R)	R^2	Variables	P Value
Independent: Motivation & commitment attribute	.917	.841	Motivation and commitment attribute	.000
			Ownership attribute (dependent)	.000

Dependent: Ownership attribute (dependent)				
Independent: Ownership of attribute (independent)	.933	.870	Ownership attribute (Independent)	.000
Dependent: Performance			Performance	.000
Independent: Lack of ownership attribute	.925	.855	Lack of Ownership attribute	.000
Dependent: Agency problem			Agency problem	.000
Source: Prepared by author.				

The analyses are done to test the strength the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variables. There are considerably high positive correlations between the independent and dependent variables. In the first hypothesis, the independent variable is motivation and commitment attribute of civil servants and dependent variable is ownership attribute of civil servants. Motivation and commitment attribute of civil servants have strong optimistic relation with ownership attribute of civil servants. In the second hypothesis, the independent variable is ownership attribute of civil servants, dependent variable is performance of the public sectors, and they have very strong positive relationship. From hypothesis three, it is proved that lack of ownership attribute of civil servants has positive relation with agency problem between civil servants and public sectors. The values of R-square are near to R values. Therefore, it is clear that all hypotheses are satisfied.

The smaller the p-value, the stronger the evidence that the survey rejects the null hypothesis. A p-value less than 0.05 (typically ≤ 0.05) is statistically significant. It indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis. In the Table, it is shown that p-values of all variables are near to zero, so the survey is statistically significant.

The regression analysis are displayed in the following Table.

Table 3: Regression analysis

Variables	R	Square R	Adjusted Square R	T Values Sig. (2-tailed)	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficient Beta
Motivation and commitment attribute	0.917	0.841	0.840	0.000	.15873	0.917
Ownership attribute (dependent)				0.000		
Ownership attribute (Independent)	0.933	0.870	0.869	0.000	.16500	0.933
Performance				0.000		
Lack of Ownership attribute	0.925	0.855	0.854	0.000	.14050	0.925
Agency problem				0.000		
Source: Prepared by author.						

The regression analysis is to test the hypothesis. In all cases, R-values between independent and dependent variables are more than 0.917. Therefore, all hypotheses are proved i. e. motivation & commitment attribute of civil servants generate ownership attribute of civil servants, ownership attribute of civil servant increases performance of the organizations and lack of ownership attribute creates the agency problem

R-squared is a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line. It is also known as the coefficient of determination, or the coefficient of multiple determinations for multiple regressions. The definition of R-squared is straightforward; it is the percentage of the response variable variation that is explained by a linear model. Zero percentage indicates that the model explains none of the variability of the response data around its mean. 100% indicates that the model explains all the variability of the response data around its mean. In general, the higher the R-squared, the better the model fits the data. In the Table, it is found that, R square value is enough for best-fitted data. Adjusted R-square is used to measure the goodness-of-fit statistic. The adjusted R-squared value actually decreases when the term does not improve the model fit by a sufficient amount. In each case, the values of adjusted R-square are less than R-square.

The lesser the t-value, the stronger the indication that the study rejects the null hypothesis. A t-value less than 0.05 (typically ≤ 0.05) is statistically substantial. It directs durable indication against the null hypothesis. In the Table, it is revealed that t-values of all variables are close to zero, so the survey is statistically substantial.

The standardized coefficient is measured in units of standard deviation. A beta value of 0.917 indicates that a change of one standard deviation in the motivation & commitment attribute variable results in a 0.917 standard deviations increase in the ownership attribute variable. In the most cases, values are near to one. Therefore, change one standard deviation in independent variables' will change the standard deviation of dependent variables are near to one. The regression models are best fitted here.

The Standard Error being relatively small, gives us an indication that our mean is relatively close to the true mean of our overall population. In the most cases, the Standard Error is relatively small.

Table 4: Main effects of demographic variables (an effect is statistically significant if “Sig.” < 0.05)

Variables	Gender (Sig. Value)		Tenure (Sig. Value)	
	Male	Female	Tenure-1	Tenure-2
Motivation and commitment attribute	0.918		0.339	
Ownership attribute (dependent)	0.929		0.330	

Ownership attribute (Independent)	0.754	0.788
Performance	0.895	0.883
Lack of Ownership attribute	0.247	0.179
Agency problem	0.520	0.298
Source: Prepared by Author.		

Tenure-1 includes the civil servants whose length of service is up to 15 years. Tenure-2 includes the civil servants whose length of service is more than 15 years. If the significance values are less than 0.05, the relationship between demographic variables and independent & dependent variables are significant. From the Table, it is shown that all the values are more than 0.05. The author concludes that the relationship between demographic variables with dependent & independent variables are insignificant.

7. Conclusion

In the research, the independent variables are motivation & commitment attribute, ownership attribute and lack of ownership attribute of civil servants. The dependent variables are ownership attribute of civil servants, performance of the public sectors and agency problems between civil servants and public sectors. In the first hypothesis, ownership attribute of civil servants is dependent variable and in the second hypothesis, it is the independent variable. The research's findings have proved the hypothesis one i.e. motivation and commitment attribute of civil servants have positive relation with ownership attribute of civil servants. The research's results have proved the hypothesis two i.e. ownership attribute of civil servants has very strong relation with the performance of the public sectors. The research's outcomes have proved the hypothesis three i.e. lack of ownership attribute of civil servants has positive correlation with agency problem in the public sectors. The supports of this paper observed in the light of several limits. The author collects the primary data from one point of place i. e. from civil servants of Bangladesh. The empirical studies want more association conclusions on the connections. Another limit is the reliant on self-reported survey data, creating agonies about probable mono-technique and bias extravagant techniques. Some data are collected through internet and there was no face to face communications between author and respondents.

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